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The Right Hon. Justin Trudeau, 
Prime Minister of Canada, 
Office of the Prime Minister 
80 Wellington St, 
Ottawa, ON  
K1A 0A2 
 
September 19, 2016 
 
Dear Prime Minister, 
 
RE: Commission of Inquiry on Afghan Detainees 
 
As you are likely aware, Minister of Defence Sajjan, on behalf of the 
Government of Canada, rejected the request in House of Commons E-Petition 
E-70 for a commission of inquiry on various aspects of Canada’s policy and 
practice with respect to the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan.   For your 
ease of reference, I attach E-70 and Minister of Sajjan’s response (Appendices 1 
and 2).  I write to ask you to review, and reverse, the decision of your Minister 
of Defence. 
 
Coincidentally, I write, as the new Parliamentary sitting begins, on the same day 
that CBC has begun detailed reporting on the complicity of the RCMP, CSIS 
and the Department of (then) Foreign Affairs in torture overseas of three 
Canadians during the previous Liberal government’s tenure.  The documentation 
revealed by civil litigation has produced incontrovertible evidence of the 
willingness of officials under the previous government to arrange for the 
detention and interrogation of Canadians by a government that our officials 
knew would torture those Canadians.   
 
Today’s revelations are directly relevant to the Afghan-detainee question. If 
officials serving within a Liberal administration are capable of deliberate 
violation of both Canadian and international criminal law (whether with or 
without the sanction of ‘legal advice’ of government lawyers), why would 
anyone think that the same mindsets and willingness would not exist and be 
given room to act within the government of Mr. Harper in relation to 
Afghanistan?  Only a commission of inquiry on the Afghan detainees will be 
able to examine all the relevant paper trails – including the many documents 
withheld from a 2010-2011 ad hoc parliamentary process on the basis of 
solicitor-client privilege – to determine exactly why and with what knowledge 
Canadian decision-makers persisted in sending hundreds and hundreds of people 
to brutalization at the hands of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, 
Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, affiliated paramilitaries and 
quite possibly US actors as well. 
 
To return specifically to Minister Sajjan’s negative decision, he opens and 
closes his response with virtually the same emphatic claim.  The penultimate 
sentence in the response reads: “Throughout Canada’s military operations in 
Afghanistan, the Government of Canada ensured individuals detained by the 
CAF were treated humanely and handled, transferred or released in accordance 





observer of this issue believes this to be true, in view of all the facts that are 
known despite much effort by the previous government.  Nor, I imagine, would 
most Liberal MPs, while in opposition, have dreamed a member of a new 
Liberal Cabinet would make such a sweeping and inaccurate statement.   
 
I also attach the statement I released immediately following Minister Sajjan’s 
response to E-70 (Appendix 3). In that statement, I make an observation that I 
believe to be fully accurate which, to the extent it is indeed accurate, may help 
you realize that this whole file does need a second look by you personally. I 
reproduce it below:  
 
[Minister Sajjan’s response to E-70] is full of gaps, elisions, and 
misdirection. …An analysis of those problems will come later. For the 
moment, I will limit myself to [the] truly shocking blanket claim that 
ends the government’s response…. These words could have been penned, 
word for word, by the previous Conservative government.  …[T]he fact 
is they may well have been written by some of the same officials and 
lawyers who ran the Harper-era messaging strategy.  It is deeply 
disappointing that the Liberal government has chosen to add another 
link to a chain of complicity that for over a decade has seen non-stop 
efforts on the part of various Canadian government actors to hide the 
truth and block any form of accountability.  I had expected far more 
from this government. 
Apart from one major matter addressed below, it continues not to be my purpose 
to lay bare, at the moment, the considerable number of “gaps, elisions and 
misdirection” in Minister Sajjan’s response. That day will come soon enough if 
your government does indeed choose to endorse the Harper legacy and continue 
to reject a commission of inquiry.  
 
As already noted, the reason I am now writing is to urge your direct intervention 
on this file.  I respectfully request that you inform yourself of what information 
the Government of Canada already has at its disposal that points to the 
compelling need for a commission of inquiry – and to then ensure that Minister 
Sajjan’s decision is reversed by Cabinet.  As part of such an intervention, I 
respectfully suggest that you specifically consult with your Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Stéphane Dion, as to whether or not he has reason to believe a 
commission would be beneficial for our democracy, the rule of law and 
Canada’s reputation in the world, given information at his disposal and any 
briefings he or his staff have sought and received since he became Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.    
 
Not only did Mr. Dion, as Member of Parliament in the then Official 
Opposition, have some exposure – although by no means full exposure – to 
some relevant documentation when an ad hoc parliamentary working group was 
set up in 2010 in response to the Speaker’s ruling against Mr. Harper’s 
government, but also he may well now have had the opportunity to acquire 
further information from any of a number of civil servants in his department 





institutional knowledge of these civil servants may possibly include what may 
have taken place by way of a cover-up across various departments and the PMO.  
In this regard, do recall that Minister Dion stated, when a batch of redacted 
documents were released in 2011 by the Harper government as an outcome of 
the compromise parliamentary process in which he participated, that “[w]hen 
you read these documents, you will have questions to ask to your Prime Minister 
and your Ministers.”  Keep in mind that Minister Dion would have seen the text 
behind some of the redactions – alongside generally appreciating what gaps and 
elisions of the overall documentary record placed before the committee – and 
formed a view about the kinds of unanswered questions and still-hidden facts 
that were still outstanding. 
   
I mentioned above that there is one major matter I did want to address arising 
from Minister Sajjan’s response to E-70.  As part of your consultation, I would 
ask that you specifically ask both Minister Dion and Minister Sajjan whether or 
not either of them or their officials have information about a system used by the 
last government and the Canadian military to avoid registering persons taken 
captive by Canadian troops in Afghanistan – and to thereby facilitate Canada’s 
ability to transfer detainees to Afghanistan government agencies (and possibly 
even to the US) without informing the International Committee of the Red Cross 
or the then Department of Foreign Affairs, such that neither the ICRC nor 
DFAIT would know to undertake any monitoring of such persons and such that 
these off-the-books detainees effectively disappeared.   
 
As the consequence of over three years of making inquiries and investigating 
while Member of Parliament for Toronto-Danforth (2011-2015) along with 
considerable further digging since my defeat in the October 19, 2015, election, I 
have multiple reasons for believing that the Canadian Department of National 
Defence replicated, at least in part, an American parallel detainee system that 
treated detainees ‘off the books’ by labelling some detainees as “Persons Under 
Control” (or PUCs) with possible terminological variations like “persons under 
custody” (also producing PUCs as an acronym). One hint of such a system arose 
from failure of the military to redact part of an (otherwise heavily redacted) 
CAF Board of Inquiry report that referred briefly and obliquely to “PUCs.”   
 
Other evidence exists.  At least one Canadian soldier has revealed that, in some 
contexts, soldiers were told to desist from calling persons in their custody 
“detainees.” Also, there is evidence Canadian Special Forces spoke amongst 
themselves of “PUC kits” (which I am assuming included things like wrist 
restraints and so on).  And, disturbing conclusions arise from scrutiny of various 
published contemporary histories and memoirs in which the numbers of 
prisoners taken by Canadian forces in certain engagements and operations are 
reported. When these accounts are compared to official records of detainees that 
came out through the ad hoc parliamentary process, there appears to be evidence 
of many dozens, possibly into the hundreds, of Afghan prisoners who were 
detained ‘off the books’ (as they do not figure in the official detainee numbers), 






There may have been many more PUC’ed than that, because these comparisons 
are subject to the hit-and-miss coverage of incidents and missions in published 
accounts.  In this respect, whereas we all became used to the detainee issue 
being one involving transfer to the substantial risk of torture (and actual 
resulting torture) at the hands of the National Directorate of Security, I am 
greatly concerned that some, if not many, of these PUC’ed detainees were 
passed to the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, and/or 
paramilitary units not ‘just’ to subsequent abuse but also quite probably to 
extrajudicial execution. 
 
It is apparent that the military has wanted to keep this PUC category secret. One 
confirmation of this came when I filed an Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41
st
 
Parliament) while MP for Toronto Danforth, the fourth or fifth I filed on the 
detainee issue.   A number of the sub-questions in Q-1117 were aimed at getting 
an answer from the government whether there was a category beyond official 
“detainees.”  I reproduce the sub-questions intended to elicit answers related to 
PUC’ed detainees and related transfers (omitting sub-questions [a] to [l] and [u] 




(m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban 
fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the 
Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in 
Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the 
government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons 
controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known 
about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of 
Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of 
their whereabouts;  
 
(n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government 
consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada 
passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not 
categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, 
whether formal or informal;  
 
(o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were 
transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as 
covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan 
Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what 
basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the 
agreements;  
 
(p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were 
transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not 
made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so, 






(q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters 
decided what information could be released to Parliament, were 
documents withheld from this process by the government if they 
concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as 
covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan 
Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer;  
 
(r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005 
detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many 
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US 
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan 
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons 
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, 
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) 
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as 
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to 
which Afghan authorities;  
 
(s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer 
Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007 
detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many 
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US 
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan 
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons 
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, 
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) 
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as 
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to 
which Afghan authorities;  
 
(t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer 
Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many 
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US 
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan 
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons 
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, 
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) 
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as 
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to 
which Afghan authorities… 
 
It is clear that the government understood what I was asking, and that I was 
giving them the opportunity to reveal the existence of a category called “Persons 
Under Control” or a like category such as “persons under custody.”  This the 
government did not do, although it did acknowledge in general terms something 
significant, namely that Canada did use other terms for persons “detained” other 





“detainees” could also be transferred no differently than persons formally 
treated as “detainees.” This alone is very significant information. I reproduce a 
passage that is used as part of the answers to four of the sub-questions 
(specifically sub-questions [n], [r], [s], and [t]):  
 
Since the start of their operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Armed 
Forces have, as a matter of policy, treated all persons in Canadian care, 
custody or control, humanely, in accordance with the same established 
Government of Canada process for handling, release, transfer or post-
transfer monitoring, and in accordance with our obligations under 
international law. Several terms were used to refer to persons detained 
by the Canadian Armed Forces, including "detainees". The use of these 
terms did not in any way affect the Canadian Armed Forces' 
appreciation of their obligations towards these individuals. Whether or 
not the term "detainee" was applied in a particular case has never been 
a factor in determining Canada's processes for handling, release, 
transfer or post-transfer monitoring of persons under Canadian Armed 
Forces care, custody or control. [my emphasis] 
 
The overall impression the government (through Defence Minister Peter 
MacKay) wants to leave is that categorization did not make any difference 
because all “persons in Canadian care, custody or control” were treated 
humanely, legally and according to processes no less legal or humane according 
to the category used.  However, careful reading of the language in these 
identical passages reveals lawyerly hedging on exactly what the government 
was indeed saying.  Apart from a circumlocution in sentence structure that 
creates interesting challenges in determining exactly what is being claimed, 
there are also potentially significant gaps in the list of things Canada is said to 
do regardless of the label of the person in custody; note that registration/record-
keeping of captives is not necessarily included in “handling” and note that there 
is no specific statement that notification of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross is one of the always-present practices. 
 
But most significant is that, although Minister MacKay and its drafters uses this 
exact above-quoted formula as part of answering four sub-questions (“n” and 
then “r”, “s” and “t”), for some reason they decided not to employ this language 
for “o” and “p” when the formula would appear to be no less relevant.  What 
were “o” and “p” about?  Recall that they asked whether some persons in 
Canadian custody or control were, first of all, deemed not to be covered by the 
transfer agreements signed with Afghanistan and, secondly, deemed not to 
require notification to the International Committee of the Red Cross.  Why, 
when this formula proved so relevant for other answers, was it not called in aid 
for these questions?  From my experience with many Order Paper Questions 
while an MP, the government was never shy to write exactly the same answer 
for every sub-question they deemed applicable.  I believe there is a good chance 
that their omission of this formula in “o” and “p” could easily be because the 
answer to each of these crucial questions was “Yes”, but the Department of 






Then, when one reads what the answer to sub-question “o” was, one 
immediately notices that it does not actually answer the question asked.  Rather, 
it gives one solitary example of a transfer not done according to MOU terms, 
and then conspicuously fails to say anything like “and this is the only instance.”  
So that you can understand the ‘style’ of the government answer along the 
above-described lines, the answer to sub-question “o” is reproduced below: 
 
On one occasion, the Canadian Armed Forces took custody of an 
individual who, on the basis of credible grounds, was suspected of 
having committed a criminal act when employed at a Canadian Armed 
Forces facility in Afghanistan. The individual was not an insurgent, and 
was not arrested for a reason related to the Canadian Armed Forces 
mission in Afghanistan. 
 
Consistent with standard Canadian Armed Forces procedures for 
addressing crimes committed or purportedly committed by local 
nationals at Canadian Armed Forces facilities outside of Canada, the 
Canadian Armed Forces transferred this individual to the custody of an 
appropriate Afghan authority for investigation. The individual was 
visited periodically by Canadian staff while in Afghan custody to confirm 
that he had not been mistreated. 
 
As for the answer to sub-question (p), what is striking is that, here, Minister 
MacKay’s answer reverts to referring only to “detainees” when specifying who 
the ICRC had been notified about.  The answer reads as follows: 
 
Prior to June 2007, the Department of National Defence and the 
Canadian Armed Forces followed standard procedures which included 
providing the International Committee of the Red Cross with detailed 
information on each detainee captured by the Canadian Armed Forces, 
and notification of their release or transfer to Afghan custody. [my 
emphasis] 
 
On June 26, 2006, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
trade started to also provide similar notifications to the. International 
Committee of the Red Cross, in parallel with the Department of National 
Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. On June 2, 2007, the 
responsibility for notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross 
was formally transferred from the Department of National Defence and 
the Canadian Armed Forces to the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade. 
 
If you revert to the formula (reproduced earlier) that the government used in 
answers to four other sub-questions, you will see the government is careful to 
structure the passage so that “persons detained” is not the same thing as 
“detainees”, which makes it potentially significant that, here, in the response to 





is more than possible that the ICRC were only notified of “detainees” and not of 
“persons detained” (including PUC’s) more broadly.  And I believe it to be 
likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper 
Question Q1117 in order to avoid revealing this.   
 
Since being defeated as MP, I have done some further digging and have traced 
the likely origin of a PUC system to its invention in the winter/spring of 2002 by 
the American military in Afghanistan.  One account (from a former US military 
interrogator) of the origin of the term suggests that a somewhat benign reason 
for the new PUC category may have been to allow captured Afghans to be more 
easily released after interrogation if interrogation led to the conclusion they were 
not combatants; this account notes that, in this first year after 9/11, the US 
military found it difficult to secure the release of some prisoners once their 
names had been formally entered into the record system.  Whether this rationale 
was or was not at the heart of the origin of PUC’ing by the US, what seems 
highly probable from my research is that the system then morphed 
(“metastasized” is probably a better term) in Iraq into a full-blown system of 
off-the-record detention and disappearance carried out by multiple American 
actors in Iraq after the invasion of that country in 2003.   
 
Whether and how PUC’ing was adopted by Canada alongside an official 
detention system in Afghanistan would undoubtedly be one of the central tasks 
of a commission of inquiry to determine.  But, if there was such a PUC system, 
several pathways seem possible (there may be others):  
 
(a) In Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, Canada had at least one senior 
officer on the ground. Walter Natynczyk was seconded to play a major role 
commanding 35,000 US forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Indeed, 
he received a prestigious military medal from Canada for commanding combat 
operations in this war that Canada had deliberately not taken part in qua country.  
As you will know, Natynczyk was later appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff 
under General Hillier in 2006, and came to play a key role in Afghanistan.  
Between his role in Iraq and his elevation to Vice-Chief status, he assumed a 
role that would have given him an extra exposure to detention and transfer 
issues as head of the Land Force Doctrine and Training system. 
 
(b) It could be that learning about the US PUC system took place at desk level 
versus in the field -- namely, back in North America.  In the relevant period, 
there would have been regular close exchanges between our military and 
intelligence agencies and the Pentagon and CIA, whether at the very top (e.g. 
via General Hillier, when Chief of Defence Staff) or at a more functional level.  
As for the latter, Lt-General Michel Gauthier headed DND’s military 
intelligence for a couple years, a role which would have involved close 
collaboration with the US on intelligence-oriented practices and policies in the 
‘war on terror’.  Indeed, Washington, DC, sources of mine suggest that it is also 
worth asking whether a meeting between Gauthier and Defence Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s most valued advisor, Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence 





Kandahar-related policy and practices with US’ ‘war on terror’ imperatives and 
methods in exchange for Canada being handed Kandahar (in preference to the 
UK, which wanted it instead of Helmand).  Subsequently, for key periods, Lt-
Gen. Gauthier was a (if not, the) central decision-maker on when, whether and 
how Canada would transfer Afghan prisoners to Afghanistan.  As his mini-bio 
also says on The Governance Network’s website, Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian 
Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions 
abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan.”  
 
(c) It could be that Canadian forces were (or, were also) directly schooled in 
PUC’ing by American forces in Afghanistan itself, either at the time of the 
handover to Canada in Kandahar in early 2006 or through more longstanding 
relations arising from the joint operations of US and Canadian special forces.   
 
All three of these could well have played a role in the evolution of a Canadian 
PUC’ing system in Afghanistan.   
 
I have a good number of other reasons that lead me to believe that a commission 
of inquiry is as warranted and indispensable now as it was when opposition 
parties called for it on multiple occasions in the 2007-2011 period. They include 
troubling questions about the role of government lawyers across a number of 
ministries. However, I am highlighting the issue of PUC’s both because this is 
information that has remained largely hidden from view.  Also, if true, an 
accountability-avoiding PUC system would take the matter to another plane of 
wrongdoing and would also demonstrably disprove many of the claims of the 
Harper government, the Canadian military, and now Minister Sajjan that Canada 
under the Conservatives took care not to be complicit in torture of persons we 
transferred from our custody.    
 
If the possible existence of a PUC system and its consequences are news to you, 
then I trust that you will appreciate how a commission of inquiry is the 
minimum necessary response.  In this regard, please note that I raise this with 
you directly as Prime Minister as a last resort.  Allow me to elaborate.  
 
My work as MP on this issue was intended to lead to a plan of action should the 
NDP have formed government or been part of a government.  When that went 
by the wayside, I initiated e-petition E-70 shortly after my October 2015 defeat 
(in December 2015).  Well before the response to E-70 was due, I made sure to 
remind the government that the Q-1117 questions had not come from nowhere, 
and that my suspicions about a PUC policy/practice had not gone away. I did 
this by giving an interview that resulted in the possibility Canada had a PUC 
system being published in an article written by Canadian Press journalist, 
Murray Brewster.   
 
While my preference would have been for concerns about a PUC system to be 
raised once a commission of inquiry was in place, I felt I needed to go public in 
relation to E-70 so that there would be no excuse for various government 





matter ahead of making the decision on E-70’s request for a commission of 
inquiry.  Despite some of my cynicism that developed after four years of being 
an MP and watching how government worked under the Harper government, I 
allowed myself to be hopeful that this new information, aired publicly in the 
national press, would help spur your government to make good on your 
expressed desire to lead a government that would be much more attentive to 
democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and our reputation in the world.   
 
You can thus imagine my disappointment when the response from Minister 
Sajjan was published. 
 
This letter, accordingly, is my good faith effort to ask one last time that your 
government, and that you as a Prime Minister of a very different stripe from 
your predecessor, do the right thing on this file. After consulting your Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and more widely as needed, I would accordingly ask you to 
request that your Cabinet exercise its authority under the Inquiries Act to 
establish a royal commission with a mandate along the lines of what E-70 was 
requesting 
 
I should say something further. I regret that I feel I have no choice but to appeal 
directly to you as Prime Minister and make what would ordinarily be a 
redundant request that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be brought into a file of 
this sort.  However, all indications are that the Department of Global Affairs was 
cut out of the decision-making chain on e-petition E-70.  Just for example, 
journalists who sought Minister Dion’s views on E-70 (and his explanation for 
why he was not leading the file) were told by Department of Global Affairs 
officials to contact the Department of National Defence.  
 
This management of the file deliberately sidelined the Minister who should, 
along with the Prime Minister, have had charge of this file.  There are two 
reasons for this, which are set out in a posting I placed online on June 10, ahead 
of Minister Sajjan’s response (attached as Appendix 4).  One is that Minister 
Sajjan is in a conflict of interest in ruling on this file; not only should he not 
have assumed what appears to be virtually sole carriage of the file, he should 
have recused himself from any part in the decision. The second is that this file 
should involve the entire Cabinet, not just due to the importance of the issues 
but also given how many different ministries were part of detainee policy and 
were also part of the previous Government’s obstructionist and untruthful 
responses to revelations about the treatment of detainees transferred by Canada.  
 
From the beginning, it probably should have been you as Prime Minister, 
supported by the Privy Council office and in consultation with Cabinet, who 
should have issued the response to E-70 – or, if not, Foreign Minister Dion after 
consultation with you and Cabinet.  As it stands, you do have the opportunity to 
take a close second look at this because, as far as I know, you have yet to reply 
to the June 7, 2016, open letter written to you by a number of prominent 
Canadians including one of Canada’s most respected elder statespersons, the 






I end by reiterating my request that you review this matter and personally decide 
whether you support Minister Sajjan’s decision or whether, upon reflection and 
wider consultation, you believe the decision was too hasty and in error.  I hope 
you choose the honourable path, which I trust you will recognize is also the wise 
path. We need – at minimum – an independent judicial commission of inquiry.   
 





Craig Scott,  
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; 
former MP for Toronto-Danforth 
 
cc:   The Hon. Stéphane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence 
 
The Hon. Thomas Mulcair, MP & Leader of the NDP  
 
Hélène Laverdière, MP & NDP Foreign Affairs Critics 
 
Randall Garrison, MP & NDP National Defence Critic 
 







Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau of September 19, 2016 
from Professor Craig Scott 
 
Appendix 1 
E-petition e-70 (Afghanistan) 
42ND PARLIAMENT 
Initiated by Craig Scott from Toronto, Ontario, on December 17, 2015, at 10:08 a.m. (EDT)  
Petition to the Government of Canada 
Whereas: 
 many Canadians remain ashamed by Canada's approach to Afghan detainees in relation 
to both treatment in Canadian custody, notably transfer to other states despite the risk 
of torture, and torture, other inhuman or degrading treatment, disappearance and/or 
extrajudicial killing to which some of them fell victim after their transfer to other states; 
and 
 many also are disappointed by the poor record of Canadian justice and parliamentary 
institutions in bringing the relevant facts to light and in securing proper accountability. 
We, the undersigned, citizens of Canada, request (or call upon) the Government of Canada to 
establish an independent judicial commission of inquiry to:  
 
1. investigate the facts with respect to policies, practices, legal and other opinions, decisions, 
and conduct of Canadian government actors, including Ministers and senior officials, 
concerning Afghan detainees throughout Canada's involvements in Afghanistan from 2001; 
 
2. investigate also the success and/or failure of Canada's justice and parliamentary systems in 
achieving transparency, democratic accountability, and compliance with applicable laws; and 
 
3. issue a thorough, comprehensive and public report on the facts as found and on the 
commission's assessment of those facts in order: (a) to determine whether state or 
governmental responsibility arose under international and/or Canadian law; (b) to assess 
whether any Canadian government officials engaged in misconduct in relation to respect for 
law, legal process, or parliamentary procedure; and (c) to recommend policy changes as well as 









Response to E-70 by the Government of Canada, Tabled June 16, 2016 
 
RESPONSE TO PETITION 
 
Prepare in English and French marking ‘Original Text’ or ‘Translation’ 
PETITION NO.: 421-00217 
 
BY: MR. STEWART (BURNABY SOUTH) 
 
DATE: MAY 3, 2016 
PRINT NAME OF SIGNATORY: HONOURABLE HARJIT S. SAJJAN 
Response by the Minister of National Defence 
SIGNATURE 





ORIGINAL TEXT REPLY 
 
Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001 and 
ended in March 2014, the Government of Canada was committed to ensuring that individuals 
detained by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were handled and transferred or released in 
accordance with our obligations under international law. The CAF treated all detainees 
humanely. The standards of protection afforded by the Third Geneva Convention were applied 
as a matter of policy. Protections included providing detainees with food, shelter and necessary 
medical attention. In addition, specific pre-deployment training for Canadian Armed Forces 
members involving the handling and transfer of detainees was provided. 
 
After more than three decades of civil conflict, the capacity of the Afghan justice and 
correctional system was seriously eroded. Canada and our allies understood the need to 
support law and order in Afghanistan by building the capacity of the police, judicial and 
corrections sectors through targeted capacity-building efforts. 
 
We worked with and trained the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to 
increase the Afghan Government’s capacity to handle detainees appropriately. Canada made 
significant investments to help build capacity in 
rule of law functions, including police, judicial and correctional services. Canada funded and 
worked closely with independent organizations, including the Afghanistan Independent Human 
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Rights Commission (AIHRC), to strengthen their abilities to monitor, investigate, report and act 
on issues involving the treatment of detainees. 
 
In the early stages of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, the CAF transferred Afghan 
detainees to United States (US) authorities, and while on joint operations supporting 
capacity building of the ANDSF, transferred detainees to Afghan authorities. 
 
In 2005, Canada established the Canada-Afghanistan arrangement for the Transfer of 
Detainees with the Government of Afghanistan, which outlined roles and responsibilities with 
regard to the transfer of Canadian-taken detainees to Afghan authorities. In particular, the 
Afghan government’s sovereign responsibility for all issues related to the rule of law and 
justice in its territory underpinned the 2005 arrangement. 
 
In addition to setting the framework for transfers, this arrangement reinforced the 
commitments of both parties to treating detainees humanely and in accordance with the 
standards of the Third Geneva Convention. This arrangement also specifically prohibited 
the application of the death penalty to any Canadian-transferred detainee. 
 
In 2007, Canada signed a Supplementary Arrangement that clarified Canada’s expectations 
and the Government of Afghanistan’s responsibilities. This arrangement provided Canadian 
officials with unrestricted and private access to Canadian transferred detainees, and 
committed Afghan authorities to notify Canada when a detainee was transferred, sentenced 
or released from custody, or had his status changed in any other way. Canada retained the 
right to refuse follow-on transfers to a third party. In the case of allegations of mistreatment, 
the Afghan Government committed, through this arrangement, to investigate and, when 
appropriate, bring to justice suspected offenders in accordance with Afghan law and 
applicable international legal standards. 
 
In 2008, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal examined Canada’s detainee policies 
and procedures in Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 
2008 FAC 336, affirmed by 2008 FACA 401, leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada 
denied. In this decision, the Courts set out that International Law, including the Law of 
Armed Conflict, provided the legal basis upon which the CAF conducts its operations and 
detainee handling. 
 
In 2010, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) in order to gain a 
clear understanding of the specific details of an incident of 14 June 2006, in Afghanistan, 
during which a person in CAF custody was handed over to Afghan authorities and then taken 
back by CAF personnel. Although the mandate of the BOI did not include undertaking a 
broad examination of Canada’s detainee management system, the BOI did review the CAF 
Theatre Standing Order (TSO) on detainees and determined that the subsequent 
amendments and improvements incorporated substantive differences compared to the TSO 





On November 18, 2011, with Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan coming to a close, 
Canada signed an arrangement with the US to facilitate the transfer of individuals detained by 
the CAF in Afghanistan to US Forces custody. The Canada- US arrangement built on and 
operated in parallel with the 2005 and 2007 arrangements signed between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of Afghanistan. Together, these arrangements allowed 
Canadian officials to monitor detention facilities, conduct interviews, and assess detainees’ 
conditions of detention and treatment. Global Affairs Canada officials monitored the 
treatment of Canadian-transferred detainees in US or Afghan detention facilities up to the 
point where detainees were sentenced by an Afghan court, or were released from custody. 
Canada’s monitoring responsibilities ended in 2014 after the last Canadian-transferred 
detainee held in Afghan custody was sentenced by an Afghan court. 
 
When a detainee was taken, any decision to transfer was made by the Canadian Task Force 
Commander as an operational matter. The Commander took into consideration the facts on the 
ground and input from a variety of Canadian, international and Afghan sources. The Canadian 
Task Force Commander made every effort to hold detainees no longer than 96 hours, during 
which time the CAF reviewed all available information and assessed whether further detention, 
transfer or release was the appropriate course of action. Any transfers to facilities managed by 
Afghanistan or other nations were assessed on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with 
applicable domestic and international law, consistent with the terms set out in our 
arrangements with those nations. 
 
Operational decisions to hold detainees longer than ISAF guidelines may have occurred for a 
variety of reasons from medical to administrative to security. These decisions were made by 
the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command based on a recommendation 
from the Commander in Theatre and took into consideration the facts on the ground and 
input from other government departments, particularly Global Affairs Canada. 
 
In the event of an allegation of abuse, Canada notified Afghan or US authorities, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the AIHRC as appropriate, Canadian 
officials followed approved protocols, which could include focused interviews with the 
detainee alleging abuse; follow up with the detaining authority; requests for investigations; an 
enhanced frequency of follow-up visits; and demarches with relevant authorities. If Canada 
had any concerns that our partners were not abiding by the arrangements, the CAF 
Commander in Afghanistan could decide to pause or suspend further transfers. 
 
In 2012, the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) completed a Public Interest 
Hearing into a complaint that certain Military Police (MP) wrongly failed to investigate CAF 
Commanders for allegedly ordering the transfer of Afghan detainees to a known risk of 
torture at the hands of Afghan security forces. The Commission’s investigation and hearing 
process spanned nearly four years. During this time, it heard testimony from 40 witnesses, 
including the eight subjects of the complaint, and held 47 days of public hearings from 2008 
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to 2011. The Commission also reviewed thousands of documents throughout its investigation. 
The Commission found the complaints against the eight individual MPs were unsubstantiated. 
 
In 2015, the Commission Chairperson made a decision to conduct a Public Interest 
Investigation into an anonymous complaint relating to the investigation of alleged 
mistreatment of detainees by the Military Police in Afghanistan in 2010-11. The complaint 
made allegations about the conduct of Military Police members involved in ordering and/or 
conducting exercises where the mistreatment was alleged to have occurred.  The complaint 
also challenges the failure to lay charges or take any other action following investigations 
conducted by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) and the MP Chain of 
Command in 2011 and 2012. The MPCC is currently awaiting disclosure of relevant material 
from the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM). Once disclosure is received, the 
Commission will determine the scope of the investigation, identify the individual subjects of 
the complaint and notify them. It will then begin to interview witnesses and review materials. 
 
Canada is proud of the honourable work of the men and women in uniform and civilian 
officials who served in Afghanistan. Canada remains the leading donor supporting the work 
of the AIHRC to strengthen its capacity to fulfill its constitutional mandate to monitor human 
rights in Afghanistan. Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, the 
Government of Canada ensured individuals detained by the CAF were treated humanely and 
handled, transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law. 
Therefore the Government of Canada does not believe an independent judicial commission 









June 17, 2016 
Statement by Craig Scott on the Government of Canada’s Response to the Request in E-
Petition E-70 to Establish a Commission of Inquiry on the Treatment of Afghan Detainees 
The government of Prime Minister Trudeau has just responded to e-petition E-70, which calls 
for a commission of inquiry into the treatment of Afghan detainees by Canada.  
Notwithstanding that the Liberal Party, while in opposition, voted for a motion in the House of 
Commons calling for just such a commission of inquiry (a motion which passed), the Liberal 
government has now rejected this call.  
The text of E-70 and the government response can be found here:  
https://petitions.parl.gc.ca/en/Petition/Details?Petition=e-70 (Scroll down page to the section 
called “Government response” and click on the embedded PDF link.) The text is also copied 
below as an appendix to this statement, for ease of reference. 
I thank the government for what appears to be an earnestly long answer (a full three pages).  
However, it is full of gaps, elisions, and misdirection. I have already noted a full dozen such 
problems, and others with knowledge of this issue will undoubtedly see even more.  An analysis 
of those problems will come later. For the moment, I will limit myself to an analysis of a truly 
shocking blanket claim that ends the government’s response: 
“Canada is proud of the honourable work of the men and women in uniform and civilian 
officials who served in Afghanistan. Canada remains the leading donor supporting the work of 
the AIHRC to strengthen its capacity to fulfill its constitutional mandate to monitor human 
rights in Afghanistan. Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, the Government 
of Canada ensured individuals detained by the CAF were treated humanely and handled, 
transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law. Therefore 
the Government of Canada does not believe an independent judicial commission of inquiry is 
necessary.” 
These words could have been penned, word for word, by the previous Conservative 
government.  To the extent they were penned by others and not directly by the Minister signing 
off on the response (Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan), the fact is they may well have been written 
by some of the same officials and lawyers who ran the Harper-era messaging strategy.   
It is deeply disappointing that the Liberal government has chosen to add another link to a chain 
of complicity that for over a decade has seen non-stop efforts on the part of various Canadian 
government actors to hide the truth and block any form of accountability.   
I had expected far more from this government, perhaps mostly because the Hon. Stéphane 
Dion is now Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister Dion had been very clear when in 
opposition that Canadians still needed to know answers to questions that had still not been 
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answered by the time the Harper government shut down all parliamentary scrutiny after 
winning the May 2011 election.  I was further encouraged when it was Minister Dion who 
announced on May 2 of this year that Canada would finally be ratifying a protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture that allows for international on-site inspection of detention centres 
in order to help prevent torture.   
Unfortunately, the handling of this E-70 file, alongside the recent Open Letter (attached) calling 
for a commission of inquiry, has been driven by the Prime Minister’s Office in coordination with 
the Department of Defence. It seems the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been frozen out of the 
process.  I wish to be clear that it is wholly inappropriate that Minister Sajjan has headed this 
decision process, given the possibility he may have relevant general knowledge (and possibly 
also specific knowledge) arising from his command and military intelligence roles in Afghanistan 
at relevant times.  Minister Sajjan should have recused himself from this decision. 
It is all the more disappointing the government is rejecting a commission of inquiry given recent 
revelations this week (reported in La Presse) from military police officers concerning events in 
2010-2011, on top of everything already revealed by journalists and diplomat Richard Colvin 
about 2006-2007. This seems to have done nothing to persuade the present government of its 
moral responsibility to act differently on this file from the previous Harper Government.   
I do not believe Canada can seriously promote human rights and rule of law values, let alone try 
to project a “Canada is back” sunny virtue, around the world when we are not prepared to 
account for Canadians’ concern about our own complicity in torture, disappearances and extra-
judicial killings – by way of our policies and practices of transferring captives to Afghan agencies 
known to engage in frequent and/or systematic perpetration of these violations – and our own 
alleged direct involvement in abusive treatment of detainees while simultaneously setting up a 
system to hide the fact those detainees were in our custody (as just revealed in the La Presse 
reports).  
And I don’t believe that these practices will not repeat themselves in future simply because a 
Defence Minister stands several times in the House of Commons in Question Period and talks 
about the great international humanitarian law training the Canadian military receives and also 
imparts to others.  
It is impossible to be confident that such a future will miraculously emerge when too many 
institutions failed to get to the truth about Afghan detainees even as too many other 
governmental actors were actively corrupting our democracy through disdain for 
accountability, through lies and through deniability mechanisms and cover-ups.  Even as the 
Defence Minister has stood in the House making such blithe pronouncements, military police 
officers are stating their belief that the government – this government – has not been 
cooperating with the Military Police Complaints Commission and have set out details to 
substantiate their conviction that aspects of Canada’s military culture regressed to replicate 
some of the problems that emerged at the time of the Somalia mission.  Make no mistake, here 
I am talking about the culture within the military hierarchy and not about the brave and 
honourable men and women who worked within the policies, practices and direct orders 
decided upon by the hierarchy. 
8 
 
And I am far from alone in these beliefs. For example, alongside over 40 others from diverse 
public service backgrounds, from the human rights advocacy community and from the 
academy, former Prime Minister Joe Clark had the following to say to the current Prime 
Minister in the above-mentioned Open Letter of June 7: 
“Mr. Prime Minister, [t]his is unfinished business of the most serious kind: accountability 
for alleged serious violations of Canadian and international laws prohibiting 
perpetration of, and complicity in, the crime of torture. As a result of the previous 
government’s stonewalling, there were no lessons learned, and no accountability. In a 
future military deployment, the same practices could reoccur. A public inquiry would 
serve to authoritatively investigate and report on the actions of all Canadian officials in 
relation to Afghan detainees, and to review the legal and policy framework that 
attempted to justify these actions. Based on this review, the Commission would issue 
recommendations with a view to ensuring that Canadian officials never again engage in 
practices that violate the universal prohibition of torture.” 
 
The entire letter can be found here: http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Afghan_OpenLetter-Jun7-2016_EN.pdf  
Despite the decision by the current Liberal government to act as almost a clone of the previous 
Conservative government on this issue, I have faith that there will come a day when the truth 
does come out.  When it does, I very much hope that it will not be too late for that truth to then 
be followed by proper accountability.   
To that end, I will continue to do everything I can to ensure the full truth come to light, even as 
this government has now demonstrated that a culture of complacency is so entrenched that 
justice is very unlikely to be secured through Canadian processes alone.  This likely means that 
it is with the International Criminal Court that I, and others, will now have to concentrate our 
efforts (although it remains open for independently minded Liberal MPs on the House of 
Commons’ Standing Committees for Foreign Affairs or National Defence to allow this issue to 
be placed back on the parliamentary agenda).   
Should the Prosecutor of the ICC be exposed to even some of the evidence that would have 
come to light if the Trudeau government had called a Commission of Inquiry here, and then 
choose to act on that evidence, Canadians – and this government – should be prepared to be 
jolted out of a current mix of apathy and complacency when faced squarely with the question 







Posting of June 10 on why Minister Sajjan should not be deciding 
on the establishment of a commission of inquiry 
 
Published by Craig Scott · June 10 at 12:31am ·  
On Wednesday, June 8, an Open Letter to PM Trudeau was released that calls for the 
establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate and report on Canada’s policies and 
practices concerning the transfer of detainees to Afghan agencies during the war in 
Afghanistan. Signatories include the former Prime Minister of Canada Joe Clark, the inaugural 
Chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee Ron Atkey, Ed Broadbent, Stephen Lewis, 
Canadian diplomats posted to Afghanistan during the war, the Secretary-General of Amnesty 
International Canada, and around 40 leading scholars and representatives of human rights, 
foreign policy, and lawyers’ organizations.  
You can read the Open Letter here: http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/…/Afghan_OpenLetter-Jun7-
2016…  
By Thursday, June 16, the government must respond to e-petition (e-70), which I initiated in 
December 2015 in order to require the government to provide a written response to the call for 
a commission of inquiry. You can read it here: https://petitions.parl.gc.ca/en/Petition/Details…  
What can we expect from the Liberal government? The signs are not good. Indeed, the signs 
are that the Liberals may be preparing to go back on their own demand when in opposition for 
a commission of inquiry. Not to put too fine a point on it, initial comments suggest they are 
willing to continue the complicity of the Canadian government – first under Harper and now 
under Trudeau – in ensuring there will be no accounting let alone accountability for what some 
of Canada’s most senior military officers, top civil servants, and ministers of the Crown did in 
our name. 
Right now, the Department of National Defence appears to have appropriated this matter. It is 
the tail that is wagging the dog. I say this because Minister Sajjan and his office are the ones 
making initial comments on both the Open Letter and, about six weeks ago, also on e-petition 
e-70, and the Department of Global Affairs is directing all journalists to DND for comments on 
e-70 and on Open Letter. 
This is totally inappropriate.  
The Minister of Defence was in theatre in a command role at crucial periods when prisoners 
were taken and transferred. He may even have had roles liaising on intelligence matters with 
some of the Afghan authorities that are implicated in the human rights abuses that an inquiry 
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would be looking at. Keep in mind it was the transfer to intelligence authorities at the National 
Directorate of Security that has been at the core of the detainee scandal, as it has been 
understood to date. But also, when it comes to unrecorded transfers by Canada of captives qua 
"persons under control" (PUCs) to Afghan authorities, some of those transfers were to the 
Afghan National Police and Minister Sajjan may have had to liaise with them, according to some 
biographical accounts. Some accounts have the Afghan police as at least as problematic an 
actor in their treatment of received prisoners as NDS.  
None of this is to say that Minister Sajjan had anything to do either with transfers or transfer 
policy. I do not know if he did or did not. Nor does it deny that he served our country 
honourably and bravely. By all accounts, he very much did. 
But it is to say that, at the very least, Minister Sajjan could be called to testify at an inquiry 
about his knowledge of the practices of Afghan agencies towards persons in their custody and 
also about what others (military and civilian) in the command structure should reasonably have 
known about the penchant for torture by the NDS and/or extrajudicial killing by the Afghan 
National Police. There are other matters on which he could be called as witness such as the 
general nature of intelligence sharing between Canada and Afghanistan, battlefield transfers of 
prisoners, the role of Defence Intelligence, cooperation with the US and other allies in relation 
to both detainees and intelligence, and coordination between the Canadian military and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs.  
More generally, this detainee file is in no way just a defence matter. It goes to the heart of 
Canada's foreign affairs -- and always involved multiple agencies from DND to DFAIT to Justice 
to the PMO and the PCO. It also involves how our parliamentary, justice and legal systems do 
and do not implement international law. As such, the decision on a commission of inquiry 
properly belongs with the Foreign Affairs Minister and the PM -- or Cabinet as a whole on their 
advice. In either case, Minister Sajjan should recuse himself from the decision on E-70's and the 
Open Letter's calls for a commission of inquiry. 
 
